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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses ownership and control structures of Dutch listed companies.
Legislation effective since 1992 mandates all shareholders with holdings of 5 percent
or more in Dutch companies to disclose their holdings. Our analysis shows that the
average ownership stakes of the largest and the three largest shareholders are 27% and
41%, respectively. The average ownership stakes of banks, insurance companies and
other financial institutions are relatively low.  We observe that voting rights are more
concentrated than ownership rights; the use of a supervisory board representing
interests of different stakeholders is ubiquitous; and listed companies use different
forms of antitakeover defense measures.
1. INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this paper is to exhibit some of the evidence available regarding
the ownership and control of Dutch listed companies. The paper also describes the
legal framework of firms in general and the disclosure of share ownership in
particular, together with some of the specificities of the Dutch legal and institutional
framework for corporate governance.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 of the paper presents important features
of major forms of enterprises in the Netherlands. The purpose of this section is to
place listed firms in context, and to give an idea of their relative importance. Section 3
describes the framework for reporting and publicising ownership stakes in the
Netherlands. Section 4 presents our analysis on the ownership and control structure in
Dutch listed companies. The summary and conclusions are presented in section 5.
2. FORMS OF ENTERPRISES
2.1 Major legal entities1
A firm is set up by a notary’s deed that records the amount of capital and the number
of shares issued, the identity of founding executives, the statutes including the name,
the seat of business (which must be in the Netherlands), goals of business, the
provisions for replacement of executives and any procedures for blocking the transfer
of shares. A declaration of approval is needed from the Minister of Justice, who can
deny it if shady people are involved or the proposed statutes do not conform to the
law. All this information must be reported in the Company Register (handelsregister)
maintained by the local Chamber of Commerce. The law specifies the information to
be disclosed by individual firms on an ongoing basis (annual accounts, etc.). Such
information is publicly available for viewing, while extracts and summaries are
supplied on request at cost.
The largest and most important firms that constitute legal entities in the Netherlands
are public limited companies (Naamloze Vennootschap, NV) and private limited
companies (Besloten Vennootschap, BV). Currently, there are about 2,000 NVs and
more than 150,000 BVs. The NVs are quite small in number, although these are on
average the largest firms. The NV status is usually a prerequisite for listing on the
Amsterdam Stock Exchange. Some less economically important legal forms include
cooperatives, partnerships, associations, foundations and sole proprietorships. The
entity of BV was introduced only in 1971 when NVs were first obliged by law to
publish their annual accounts. Almost 90% of the 50,000 or so NVs existing at that
time subsequently converted to BV status. BVs are generally smaller firms, and also
sometimes used as a form of professional partnership.
Important differences between NVs and BVs concern transferability of shares and
constraints on the issue and buyback of shares. An NV can issue both bearer and
registered shares while a BV can only issue registered shares. Whereas the statutes of
an NV can limit the free transferability of shares, the statutes of a BV must do so
(except the possibly for transfers to other existing shareholders, close family and the
BV itself). Shares issue and buybacks are stricter for an NV than for a BV. For
example, a BV can acquire up to 50% of its own issued capital while an NV only 10%
without ongoing shareholder approval. In a BV, the statutes can rule out pre-emptive
rights for existing shareholders when new capital is issued. In an NV, a decision of the
shareholder meeting is required.
All firms, which ordinarily employ at least 100 employees must set up a works
council (ondernemingsraad).2 This is a body for representing and consulting the
views of employees. It has a right to relevant information, a right to advise on major
decisions (e.g. transfers of ownership, relocation and important investments); it can
delay decisions it disagrees with for one month and appeal to the company chamber of
the Amsterdam Court. Its permission is required for changes in social arrangements
(pensions, working hours, wages, safety rules), and if it disagrees, the employer must
obtain a local judge’s decision to go ahead.
                                                                                                                                                                     
1 Our description is primarily based on Slagter (1996) and Dorresteijn and Verhorst (1994).
2 Firms with at least 35 employees for 1/3 of normal working hours must also set up a works council,
but with limited responsibilities.
Firms with capital and reserves of at least ƒ25 mln, a legal obligation to set up a
works council, and at least 100 persons employed in the Netherlands fall under a
special regulation widely known as the structural regime (structuurregeling). These
frms are then obliged to set up a supervisory board (raad van commissarissen) which
inherits many powers otherwise held by common shareholders. Such a board consists
of at least three members; new members are appointed by cooptation by the board
itself (unless the shareholders’ meeting or the works council object), and the statutes
can determine that one or more are to be government appointees. The supervisory
board evaluates important managerial decisions, appoints and dismisses the
management board (raad van bestuur) and draws up the yearly accounts (which are
subjected to shareholder approval). In practice, the structural regime gives ordinary
shareholders very little say in the appointment or removal of supervisory board
members as well as the management.
The shareholders of a relatively smaller company (unless the company adopts the
structural regime) appoint management (bestuur) and directors (commissarissen) and
approve annual accounts. The management is held personally responsible for any
misbehaviour prior to a bankruptcy, the presentation of misleading accounts, improper
payment of taxes, taking on obligations to third parties that clearly cannot be met, and
environmental damage. The shareholders’ meeting has residual rights not allocated
elsewhere, as well as the right to approve annual accounts, appoint accountants,
increase and decrease the firm’s capital, hire and fire management, appoint at least 2/3
of directors and alter the statutes. By law, the statutes cannot require more than a 2/3
majority for most decisions.
2.2 Listed companies
Firms that want a listing on the stock exchange must sign a listing agreement
(noteringsovereenkomst) which sets down trading rules and listing requirements such
as the size and composition of the capital issued and the contents of the prospectus.
The listing requirements of the Amsterdam Exchanges include the following: a
history of at least five years, in at least three of which a profit must have been
reported; at least ƒ10 mln of equity capital; and at least 10% of the equity capital must
be available for trading with a market value of at least ƒ10 mln. In addition, a listed
firm must comply with additional requirements set down in the listing agreement,
which include a code of behaviour regarding trading in its own shares by company
insiders.
Since the abolition of the Official Parallel Market in October 1993 there has been only
a one-tier market in Amsterdam. Recently, a second-tier market called the New
Market Amsterdam has been established. Less stringent requirements are proposed for
firms seeking a listing on this segment. This market is also linked to the German,
French and Belgian second-tier markets under the ‘Euro-NM’ initiative: an attempt to
develop a unified trading forum for small European companies.
As mentioned earlier, NVs usually qualify for stock exchange listing. At the end of
1997, shares of 248 Dutch companies were listed on the Amsterdam Exchanges.
These companies had a market capitalisation of 907 million guilders. Dutch stock
market capitalisation represents more than 50% of the GDP (see Moerland (1995) for
an international comparison). A unique feature of the Dutch market is that a few large
companies dominate the scene. Fifteen companies including Royal Dutch, Unilever,
Philips, Elsevier, Ahold, Akzo Nobel, ING and ABN AMRO represent about 75% of
total market capitalisation of Amsterdam Exchanges. Only Royal Dutch accounts for
21% of total market capitalisation.
3. DISCLOSURE OF SHAREHOLDINGS
3.1 The legal framework
To our knowledge there is no legal obligation to disclose ownership stakes in unlisted
companies (except in the case of single-owner companies, where the identity of the
owner must be recorded in a publicly accessible company register together with a
written account of all transactions between the owner and the company). If the
company has issued registered shares, as is the case for all BVs and many NVs, its
management obviously keeps a register of shareholdings, which must include the
names and addresses of all shareholders. But, there is no legal obligation to make this
information freely and conveniently accessible to the general public.
For listed companies, shareholders are subject to the disclosure requirements of the
law that carries out the EU Transparency Directive 88/627, namely the Law on
Disclosure of Shareholdings (Wet Melding Zeggenschapsrecht) which came into
effect in February 1992. Shareholders in all listed companies must notify both the
company and the Securities Board of the Netherlands (Stichting Toezicht
Effectenverkeer) of any purchases or sales of share stakes. The Board was set up in
1988 to supervise stock exchange share trading on behalf of the Minister of Finance.
Under the Law, shareholders are obliged to notify any trade which leads their share
stake to cross the notifiable boundaries of 5, 10, 25, 50 or 66 2/3 %. This obligation to
notify applies to both voting rights and ownership (income) rights separately. At the
same time, the investor must indicate whether the stake is indirect (middelijk), that is,
held via a daughter company or a third party; and whether the stake represents a
potential (potentieel) stake rather than a current one, for example in case of a
convertible bond or a warrant.
The listed company concerned is obliged to transmit this information promptly to the
Securities Board, which publishes the announcement in the financial press (in
practice, Het Financieele Dagblad) in a standardised format, after verifying the
information3. Before the law was ammended in 1997, the company itself was
responsible for making an announcement in a newspaper with nation-wide circulation.
But, it was felt that direct publication of the information by the Board would be more
transparent and less error-prone.
A major source of concern with the share stake database maintained by the Board is
that over time, it has become increasingly contaminated. The main problem is that
share stakes can and do cross the notifiable percentage boundaries whenever the total
                                                          
3 At the same time, the Amsterdam Exchanges' listing agreement requires the company to report all
price-sensitive information promptly so that it can be made public by the exchange on its electronic
information dissemination system. In practice, most mutations in large shareholdings would reasonably
be considered price-sensitive, so that the information is likely to be made public on the exchange
before the Securities Board publishes it.
outstanding share capital of the company changes; for example as a result of
employee option plans, stock dividends, or mergers paid for by issuing shares. A large
shareholder, who takes no active part in this modification of the denominator, has no
obligation to report the resulting change in his percentage stake even if his percentage
stake crosses a notifiable boundary as a result of the dilution. Thus, over time the
quality of the database, which is based on initial notifications of percentage stakes,
has deteriorated. The Board has pleaded strenuously but unsuccessfully for a new law
to institute a periodic (say annual) obligation for companies to report their total share
capital and the holdings of their known large shareholders, so that the database would
give a more accurate picture of current blockholdings. The government and a majority
in the Parliament felt that periodic disclosure would impose an unnecessary burden on
companies and large shareholders. The Board is so concerned by the contamination of
its database that it has threatened to lock up its database and stop providing the data to
third parties who request it (mostly multinationals, institutional investors, analysts and
the press).
The disclosure law is viewed as a means of providing greater transparency regarding
the ownership structure of listed companies. The Minister of Finance, however,
indicated to the Parliament in 1996 that he felt its role was simply to make market
movements visible. Opposition to the tightening of the law was not based on
considerations of administrative cost alone: since 1995, a pressure group to protect the
privacy of large individual shareholders has been working to limit information
dissemination by the Securities Board.
In 1996, the Parliament passed a revised law on the disclosure of blockholdings which
became effective in June 1997. The new law repairs several deficiencies of the old
law.
• One important lacuna concerned pre-existing large shareholders of companies
listed after the original law went into effect; such shareholders were not obliged to
notify their stakes. From now on all initial shareholders in newly listed companies
must disclose any large stakes4.
                                                          
4 Large shareholders in the 70 or so companies that were listed between February 1992 and June 1997
were given a July 1 1997 deadline to disclose their holdings. But, only 20 notifications had been
• Professional intermediaries (banks, underwriters of new issues) who retain stakes
of over 5% ‘on the shelf’ three months after a new issue or placing, must disclose
such stakes as these will be regarded as part of their investment rather than trading
portfolio.
• Custodians of stocks are now exempt from the obligation to disclose provided that
they have no control rights.
• There is now a standard form on which information must be disclosed. The
information must include the exact date on which the notification obligation arose
and the details of how the stake is held (e.g. via a daughter company).
• The law was rephrased in terms of six ‘bands’ (0 - 5, 5 - 10, 10 - 25, 25 - 50, 50 -
66 2/3, 66 2/3 - above); shareholders must report any movement of their stake into
a different band. In the past, people did not seem to realise that they also had to
disclose whenever their stake crossed a boundary downwards (a significant source
of inaccuracy in the data).
• Both open-end and closed-end funds now have a weaker disclosure obligation,
with 0 - 25% treated as one band.
• If a natural person discloses a stake, his/her ‘daughter’ company does not need to
do so as well (this was already the case for group companies under the old law).
Thus, double notifications are reduced.
• The Securities Board is empowered to correct inaccurate data.
Until May 1997, there were a total of 3300 disclosures. The notifying listed company
pays the processing cost to the Board, which is currently running at about ƒ2300
excluding the cost of newspaper publication.
3.2 Public availability of data
The Securities Board itself does not provide a record of disclosures in electronic form;
indeed, in May 1997 it announced that it would no longer provide data to third parties
at all because of its concerns about the inaccuracy of its database. Starting in 1992,
when the disclosure law first went into effect, the main Dutch financial newspaper
Het Financieele Dagblad has periodically published a supplement with a complete
                                                                                                                                                                     
received, some of which were incorrect, whilst the Board was expecting a total of about 280, namely
overview of all disclosed blockholdings, based on the original situation in 1992
adjusted by intervening announcements of changes.
The database has over time become increasingly inaccurate for a number of reasons.
First of all, when shareholders’ proportional stakes are changed, not by any trading of
their own but by changes in the total amount of issued capital of the company, they do
not need to report such changes. In addition, shareholders tend to be forgetful about
notifying decreases in their stakes. There have also been cases of large shareholders
attempting to avoid or delay disclosure in order to hide their controlling interest from
the public eye5. Lastly, pre-existing large shareholders in the 70 or so companies
newly listed between February 1992 and June 1997 have not until July 1997 been
obliged to disclose their stakes.
The newspaper Het Financieele Dagblad has taken some measures to improve the
accuracy of the data. Whenever there is a series of filings by the same shareholder in
the same company, only the most recent one has been kept. Any disclosures of stakes
strictly below 5% have been eliminated. Remnants of overlapping stakes (direct and
indirect), arising after reporting only one sale, have been removed. Some disclosures
that have been published in the press but apparently not sent to the Securities Board
are included.
The data is reported in the newspaper as follows. For each blockholding six categories
are distinguished:
a. Total ownership (capital, dividend) rights (includes b and c).
b. Indirect ownership (held by a subsidiary or a firm with which the filing firm has a
long term agreement on joint policies in exercising the voting rights).
c. Potential ownership, for example from warrants, convertibles, or call options.
d. Voting rights (includes e and f).
e. Indirect voting rights.
f. Potential voting rights
                                                                                                                                                                     
roughly four notifications per company involved.
5 Het Financieele Dagblad, May 7, 1993.  Possible sanctions range from polite reminders to fines and
imprisonment.
Clearly, these data are imperfect and further cleaning up work is needed before they
can be used in empirical research. For example, indirect holdings need to be clarified.
Sometimes in-depth perusal of the original notifications may be enough; but
sometimes it may be necessary to contact the persons and/or companies involved, in
hopes that they will be forthcoming with the information. The earlier mentioned
change in the data over time due to changes in the denominator is hard to deal with
unless the relevant law is tightened. Information on share stakes of directors and
company insiders is only available when they are reported under the disclosure law.
This means, insiders can hide the trade as long as their stakes are less than 5%. There
exists no other requirement for insiders to make their transactions public.
For all its deficiencies, the data reported in the financial daily is the only one currently
available, and in the next section, we will base our quantitative analysis on it.
4. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND VOTING RIGHTS
4.1 The sample
As mentioned before, the Dutch disclosure requirements concern only the listed firms
and shareholdings of at least 5%. The ownership data are taken from the annual
overview published in Het Financieele Dagblad on May 28, 1996. The data describe
the situation on May 8, 1996. The sample consists of 137 Dutch industrial companies
listed on the Amsterdam stock exchange.
As in the Netherlands no groups of listed companies are found, we do not analyse
groups separately. In addition, we focus on direct holdings only. Regarding indirect
holdings, we can only obtain information on stakes of listed firms in other listed
firms. Thus, the data for indirect holdings would still be incomplete. In any case, the
data for the listed firms only reveal few and minor stakes, and no controlling stakes.
We make three adjustments to the data reported in the newspaper. First, many Dutch
firms issue a large proportion of their common shares to an administrative office,
which in turn issue depository certificates to other investors after detaching voting
rights. Ownership stakes reported by these administrative offices are excluded to
avoid double counting. Because of the voting eligibility of administrative offices,
their ownership stakes are included in the analysis of voting rights. Second, reported
potential ownership stakes are not taken into account. In general, these potential rights
are non-paid up preferred stock placed in a friendly foundation (generally called
stichting preferente aandelen or stichting continuiteit). Third, the reported indirect
ownership stakes may lead to double counting, as both the subsidiary and the parent
may have filed information on the same stake. Indeed, if the parent is a person and not
a company, that was obligatory under the pre-June 1997 law. We try to correct for this
by eliminating the stake of the subsidiary. The following example using data of a
company (Wegener) illustrates our procedure:
Example: Disclosed shareholder stakes of WEGENER
Shareholder a b c d e f
Amev/VSB NV 5.15 5.15 0 - - -
Britt Holding BV 5 0 0 - - -
Heinsbroek, H.Ph.J.E. 5.837 0 0 - - -
Houwert, C.J. 21.27 21.27 0 - - -
Loeff Beheer, BV van der 21.27 0 0 - - -
Scottish Widows Invt. 5.38 0 0 - - -
Telegraaf, Holdingsmij NV 15.93 15.93 0 - - -
Wegener, St.Adm.Ktr 99.998 0 0 99.998 0 0
Wegener, St.Pref.Aand. 99.99 0 99.99 99.99 0 99.99
Wovang BV 5 0 0 - - -
Note: The column headings are defined as follows: (a) total ownership rights (capital and dividend;
it includes columns b and c); (b) indirect ownership (held by a subsidiary or a firm with which the
filing firm has a long term agreement on joint policies in exercising the voting rights); (c) potential
ownership (for example from warrants, convertibles, or call options); (d) voting rights (it includes
columns e and f); (e) indirect voting rights; and (f) potential voting rights.
For Wegener we make the following adjustments. First, the reported single stake of
99.998% by an administrative office (‘Wegener, St. Adm. Ktr’) is not taken into
account in the analysis of ownership rights. Second, the potential stake of 99.99% of
preferred stock reported by a foundation (‘Wegener, St. Pref. Aand’) is also deleted.
Third, we investigate the indirect stakes as shown in columns b and e. Although in the
row an indirect stake of Amev/VSB is reported, we can not find the direct shareholder
because no stake of the same magnitude is reported. This entry is not deleted. An
individual called C. J Houwert reported an indirect stake of 21.27%. A private
company named Van der Loeff Beheer has reported a stake of exactly the same
percentage. It is very likely that C.J. Houwert controls Van der Loeff Beheer. For this
reason this latter entry is deleted. As with the stake of Amev/VSB, the stake of
Telegraaf shows no clear resemblance with the other stakes. We choose to remove
double entries as much as possible by eliminating the subsidiaries.
4.2 Ownership
Table 1 presents summary information on the ownership (of income rights) structure
of Dutch listed companies. We find that the mean (median) size of the largest
blockholder is 26.94% (18.22%), that of the three largest blockholders is 40.64%
(34.05%), and that of all blockholders together is 47.74% (48.4%). Considerable
variation exists among the ownership stakes. The standard deviation of the largest
ownership stakes is 22% and that of the three largest blockholders is 28%. The
frequency distribution of share ownership is presented in table 2. We see that
relatively large number of firms have ownership stakes within the ranges of 25 – 50%
and 50 – 75%. Figures 1 and 2 provide graphical representations of the largest stake.
The results analysing ownership based on a broad categorisation of different types of
investors are reported in Table 3. The average ownership stakes of banks, insurance
companies and other financial institutions are 7.44%, 10.44% and 14.66%,
respectively. There are 78 firms with banks as a blockholder and 44 firms with
insurance companies as another blockholder. Individuals and corporations have
average stakes of 10.80% and 2.41% respectively.
4.3 Voting rights
Tables 4, 5 and 6 repeat the analysis for voting rights. The average size of the largest
voting stake is 42.78%. We observe that voting rights in Dutch companies are more
concentrated than ownership rights. This is mainly due to the presence of blocks
controlled by administrative offices which can be seen from Table 6. We find that
other categories of owners like banks, insurance companies, pension funds have, on
average, very low voting rights.
4.3 Takeover defenses
Most Dutch listed companies have adopted several antitakeover measures. One
commonly used device for denying voting rights to common shareholders is to set up
an administration office (administratiekantoor) that holds original shares and issues
depository certificates instead. Certificate holders retain the right to attend and speak
at shareholders’ meetings, to challenge the legitimacy of company decisions, and to
call for extra meetings just like any shareholder. They also receive dividends. But,
they have no voting rights. Votes can only be exercised by the administrative office.
Another very common method of defence against hostile takeovers is to issue
preferred shares to friendly hands. The objective is not to raise capital but to change
the balance of power in the shareholders’ meeting. Priority shares with specific
control rights are issued to friendly parties. For example, these shareholders may have
the right to make a binding nomination for the appointment of management. A
detailed analysis of these and other defense measures in the Netherlands is provided
by Kabir, Cantrijn and Jeunink (1997).
Table 7 describes the use of administrative offices which issue share certificates. We
select all shareholdings labelled under administrative offices and continuity
foundation, excluding any stakes that represent a potential rather than a current
interest. We find that 54 (39%) of the 137 firms in the sample used this device of
antitakeover defense. In the majority of these cases, more than two-thirds of the firm’s
share capital was certificated.
Table 8 describes another common device for countering the threat of takeovers: the
use of potential capital which is only issued under specified circumstances, such as
when the continuity of the firm is under threat (in other words, in case of takeover
threats).  These potential claims are typically held by a friendly foundation. We limit
our table to those firms where potential capital is at least 25% of the currently
outstanding capital (thus excluding various individuals and employee share option
schemes which typically hold no more than about a 10% stake). Note that potential
stakes can and do exceed 100% in some cases, as the denominator is currently
outstanding capital. We find that 36 of the 137 sample firms have important amounts
of potential capital. For 26 firms the amount of potential capital is even 98% or above,
suggesting that the purpose of potential stakes is to achieve a voting majority of at
least 50%.
Different anitakeover devices may substitute or complement each other. Our results
show that the use of nonvoting certificates and potential shareholdings do not seem to
be substitute defence devices, as many firms use both. Eighteen firms use both an
administrative office and have outstanding potential capital rights of over 25%.
4.4 Board supervision
As mentioned earlier, most listed Dutch companies have a supervisory board  the
members of which are appointed by cooptation without direct shareholder input. A
management board is in turn appointed by the supervisory board. There is much
current debate on whether shareholders and employees of companies should have
greater powers to appoint, re-appoint and depose supervisory board members.
As far as we know, there has not yet been any systematic quantitative information
collected about Dutch supervisory boards. The only information available is the
names of individuals acting as members of different Boards. According to the October
1996 report published by the Dutch Committee on Corporate Governance, 69
individuals are members of two Boards, 39 persons are members of three Boards, and
20 persons are members of at least four Boards. We collect information on board size
of Dutch listed companies and report the results in Table 9. We find that median size
of the management board is 2 while that of the supervisory board is 5. The maximum
number of members in the management board is 14 and that of the supervisory board
is 11.
Table 10 provides information on the percentage of shares owned by inside
blockholders. The first column lists the 25 firms in which blockholders or members of
their family are on the supervisory or the management board. The second and the
third columns provide the percentage of shares owned by members of the
management board and the supervisory board, respectively. In the fourth column the
percentage of shares owned by people with the same family name as member of the
management and the supervisory board is added. We can see that only in 19 firms,
members of the management board have shareholdings greater than 5%. For these
firms, there is no change in insider blockownership when the su[ervisory board is
added. There are 6 firms where members of the supervisory board hold stakes but
those of the management board do not. The average ownership stakes of  the
management board members, the supervisory board members and family members
(taken over our sample of 137 firms) are 4.86%, 1.82% and 0.49%, respectively.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper studies ownership and control of Dutch industrial companies listed on the
Amsterdam Exchanges. We find that the average share of the largest blockholder is 27
percent, and that of the three largest blockholders is 41 percent. We identify
ownership by different groups and observe that banks, insurance companies and other
financial instutions have, on average, low blockholdings. Analysing control aspects of
Dutch companies, we find that adminstrative offices own major voting blocks. These
and some other practices are used widely by Dutch listed companies as antitakeover
measures which explain the absence of hostile takeovers in the Netherlands.
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26.94 18.22 9.42 44.65 0 97.05 21.60
C3
40.64 34.05 21.78 58.28 0 137.92 26.95
C5
45.29 44.59 26.96 65.22 0 144.36 27.57
Call
47.74 48.40 27.70 69.69 0 144.36 28.92
Note: The sample is 137 Dutch listed companies (investment funds excluded). Ownership data are analysed for 1996.
Blockholders owning 5% or more are required to disclose ownership stakes. The concentration variables C1, C3, C5
and Call represent the percentage of ordinary shares held by the largest blockholder, the three largest blockholders, the
five largest blockholders, and all blockholders, respectively. Minimum concentration of 0 represents shareholdings of
5% or less. Maximum concentration of more than 100% is due to multiple disclosures of same shareholdings by
different owners (ocurred in case of at least two firms).
Table 2. Frequency distribution of ownership concentration.
Range C1 C3  C5  Call
Freq. % Cum. Freq. % Cum. Freq. % Cum. Freq. % Cum.
  0 -   5% 3 2.19 2.19 3 2.19 2.19 3 2.19 2.19 3 2.19 2.19
  5 – 10% 35 25.55 27.74 16 11.68 13.87 16 11.68 13.87 16 11.68 13.87
10 – 25% 40 29.20 56.93 25 18.25 32.12 12 8.76 22.63 12 8.76 22.63
25 – 50% 35 25.55 82.84 46 33.58 65.69 50 36.50 59.12 40 29.20 51.82
50 – 75% 21 15.33 97.81 31 22.63 88.32 34 24.82 83.94 39 28.47 80.29
75 – 90% 2 1.46 99.27 9 6.57 94.89 15 10.95 94.89 18 13.14 93.43
90 - 95% 0 0 99.27 3 2.19 97.08 3 2.19 97.08 5 3.65 97.08
95 -100% 1 0.73 100 2 1.46 98.54 2 1.46 98.54 2 1.46 98.54
100 - 0 0 100 2 1.46 100 2 1.46 100 2 1.46 100
Note: The sample is 137 Dutch listed companies (investment funds excluded). Ownership data are analysed for 1996. Blockholders owning 5% or more
are required to disclose ownership stakes. The concentration variables C1, C3, C5 and Call represent the percentage of ordinary shares held by the largest
blockholder, the three largest blockholders, the five largest blockholders, and all blockholders, respectively. In case of at least two companies, there were
multiple disclosures of shareholdings the addition of which led to apparent ownership of more than 100%.
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Individuals Industrial firms State
Mean
7.44 10.44 14.66 0.60 0.30 10.80 2.41 1.08
Median
5.14 0 8.52 0 0 0 0 0
Minimum
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum
58.28 93.17 85.61 19.06 18.09 97.05 27.01 50.00
Frequency
78 44 87 10 3 48 38 4
Note: The sample is 137 Dutch listed companies (investment funds excluded). Ownership data are analysed for 1996.
Blockholders owning 5% or more are required to disclose ownership stakes. The concentration variables C1, C3, C5 and Call
represent the percentage of ordinary shares held by the largest blockholder, the three largest blockholders, the five largest
blockholders, and all blockholders, respectively. The raw ‘frequency’ shows the number of firms where a particular type of
blockholder is present.










42.78 43.46 11.21 60.79 0 99.99 32.10
C3
58.13 61.08 27.60 92.24 0 148.73 37.13
C5
61.05 67.51 34.90 92.59 0 148.73 36.73
Call
62.52 69.84 35.81 93.72 0 148.73 36.73
Note: The sample is 137 Dutch listed companies (investment funds excluded). Voting rights data are analysed for
1996. Blockholders owning 5% or more are required to disclose ownership stakes. The concentration variables C1, C3,
C5 and Call represent the percentage of voting shares held by the largest blockholder, the three largest blockholders, the
five largest blockholders, and all blockholders, respectively. Minimum concentration of 0 represents voting rights of
5% or less. Maximum concentration of more than 100% is due to multiple disclosures of same shareholdings by
different owners (ocurred in case of at least eight firms).
Table 5. Frequency distribution of voting rights concentration.
C1 C3 C5  Call
Range
Freq. % Cum. Freq. % Cum. Freq. % Cum. Freq. % Cum.
  0 -   5% 14 10.22 10.22 14 10.22 10.22 14 10.22 10.22 14 10.22 10.22
  5 – 10% 16 11.68 21.90 8 5.84 16.06 8 5.84 16.06 8 5.84 16.06
10 – 25% 19 13.87 35.77 12 8.76 24.82 5 3.65 19.71 5 3.65 19.71
25 – 50% 34 24.82 60.58 24 17.52 42.34 27 19.71 39.42 21 15.33 35.04
50 – 75% 27 19.71 80.29 26 18.98 61.31 23 16.79 56.20 25 18.25 53.28
75 – 90% 9 6.57 86.86 17 12.41 73.72 22 16.06 72.26 23 16.79 70.07
90 - 95% 7 5.11 91.97 8 5.84 79.56 9 6.57 78.83 11 8.03 78.10
95 -100% 11 8.03 100 18 13.14 92.70 19 13.87 92.70 20 14.60 92.70
100 - 0 0 100 10 7.30 100 10 7.30 100 10 7.30 100
Note: The sample is 137 Dutch listed companies (investment funds excluded). Ownership data are analysed for 1996.
Blockholders owning 5% or more are required to disclose ownership stakes. The concentration variables C1, C3, C5
and Call represent the percentage of voting shares held by the largest blockholder, the three largest blockholders,  the
five largest blockholders, and all blockholders, respectively. In case of at least eight companies, there were multiple
disclosures of same shareholdings the addition of which led to apparent ownership of more than 100%. The columns
‘freq’, ‘%’ and ‘cum’ show the number of firms, the percentage of firms and the cumulative percentage of firms,
respectively.
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4.42 8.33 11.10 0.40 0.30 8.86 1.44 1.08 26.89
Median
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Minimum
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum
39.78 93.04 85.61 19.06 18.90 97.05 27.01 50.00 104.46
Frequency
48 34 61 6 3 36 22 4 54
Note: The sample is 137 Dutch listed companies (investment funds excluded). Ownership data are analysed for 1996.
Blockholders owning 5% or more are required to disclose ownership stakes. The concentration variables C1, C3, C5 and Call
represent the percentage of voting shares held by the largest blockholder, the three largest blockholders, the five largest
blockholders, and all blockholders, respectively. Maximum voting rights surpassed 100% because of multiple disclosures for
the same shareholdings. The raw ‘frequency’ shows the number of firms with a particular type of blockholder.
Table 7. Certification of common shares used by Dutch companies.
Number of firms Percentage of firms
Companies without share certificates 83 61
Companies with share certificates
These certificates are issued by at least
one administrative office with
shareholdings (x) of:
54 39
       x ≤ 25% 5 3.6
       25% < x ≤ 50% 13 9.5
       50 < x ≤ 66 2/3% 6 4.3
       66 2/3% < x ≤ 90% 11 8.0
       90 < x ≤ 99% 9 6.6
       99% < x 10 7.3
Note: All shareholdings that are labelled under administrative office (administratiekantoor) or
continuing foundation (stichting continuiteit) are included unless they represent potential rather
than actual capital. In seven cases there were two (rather than one) administrative offices involved.
Table 8.  Companies with potential voting stakes over 25%.
Number of firms
No potential capital over 25% reported 101
At least 25% potential capital
representing shareholdings (x) of:
36
       25% < x ≤ 50% 8
       50% < x ≤ 98% 0
       98% < x ≤ 100% 26
      100% < x 2
Table 9. The size of the management board (MB) and
the supervisory board (SB).
Board Size
Total MB SB
Mean 7.7 2.8 4.9
Median 7 2 5
Minimum 3 0 0
Maximum 23 14 11
Table 10. Ownership by inside blockholders in Dutch companies.
MB SB Family




































































































Average (over 137 firms)   4,86   1,82   0,49
       Note: The sample is 137 Dutch listed companies. The data on blocks of inside ownership are
       for 1996, and are expressed in percentages. MB stands for the management board; SB for the
       supervisory board; Family includes blockholders with the same surname as one or more
       members of one of the boards.
